Putting reasons in their place

dc.contributor.author	Gascón, José A.
dc.date.accessioned	2021-12-14T12:28:00Z
dc.date.available	2021-12-14T12:28:00Z
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.identifier.uri	http://repositorio.ucm.cl/handle/ucm/3588
dc.description.abstract	Hilary Kornblith has criticised reasons-based approaches to epistemic justification on the basis of psychological research that shows that reflection is unreliable. Human beings, it seems, are not very good at identifying our own cognitive processes and the causes of our beliefs. In this article I defend a conception of reasons that takes those empirical findings into account and can avoid Kornblith’s objections. Reasons, according to this account, are not to be identified with the causes of our beliefs and are useful first and foremost in argumentation instead of reflection.	es_CL
dc.language.iso	en	es_CL
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/	*
dc.source	Informal Logic, 40(4), 587-604	es_CL
dc.subject	Argumentation	es_CL
dc.subject	Epistemology	es_CL
dc.subject	Kornblith	es_CL
dc.subject	Psychology	es_CL
dc.title	Putting reasons in their place	es_CL
dc.type	Article	es_CL
dc.ucm.facultad	Facultad de Ciencias Religiosas y Filosóficas	es_CL
dc.ucm.indexacion	Scopus	es_CL
dc.ucm.indexacion	Isi	es_CL
dc.ucm.uri	informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/6070	es_CL
dc.ucm.doi	doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i4.6070	es_CL